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I am currently being ‘trained’ as a PhD supervisor, and this
article is a short reflection based on some work on the course.
But to start with a caveat: my intellectual background lies in
the humanities and law, and in this context my comments are
necessarily limited to the humanities and legal research.
The course is interesting, and it made me question to what extent it is
possible for universities to introduce formalised accredited systems for
generating research outputs and research training. Are formalistic systems institutional responses to the
instrumentalisation of intellectual endeavour and research? It made me wonder whether what is assumed to be
‘effective’ research degree supervision aiming to help research students plan, undertake, complete and
disseminate their PhD research can in fact contribute creatively to the body of human knowledge and promote
original findings.
Research students come in many shapes and sizes – some do it for instrumental reasons perhaps to progress
their professional careers outside the academy, extrinsic reasons, others for intrinsic reasons and undertake
research for their own intellectual pleasure and love of knowledge, or personal development, perhaps
perceiving a PhD as an apprenticeship to the academy.
Similarly supervisors come equipped with their own often unacknowledged assumptions and belief systems.
Thus it seems to me that to develop an ‘effective’ supervisory practice one needs to examine (in the Aristotelian
sense) one’s own unstated, hidden assumptions and beliefs as located within and mediated by the supervisor’s
institutional setting. The reflective inquiry would also include the recognition of external pressures and
changes. Though a process of internal and external self-examination the supervisor can generate a critique of
the supervision and, in my view, only a critical position can offer an original contribution to the body of
knowledge, in short this is the ‘politics of supervision’ a play of powers.
The external themes informing the politic include increasing democratisation and expansion of postgraduate
education, not only nationally but globally. For instance, at one university in Singapore admitted its first
electrical engineering postgraduate students in 1986-87 and that only six years later the engineering faculty
had 515 postgraduate students including 394 PhD by research candidates [1]. Similar pattern of increasing
recruitment of postgraduate students to taught only, masters ‘top up’ degrees, and research studies and other
glorious permutations can be seen at most universities.
Moreover, in the current adverse economic climate pushing UK universities to the ‘diversification’ of their
income streams, postgraduate students, especially those from overseas and ones not physically attending the
home university, are often seen by university bosses as a lucrative source of extra income.
Further, the injection of the imperatives and values of the ‘market’ driven by the myth of some sort of social-
Darwinian ‘survival of the fittest’, into the UK higher education sector, accompanied by the rhetoric of
individual consumer rights transforms intellectual inquiry and the way the research student is perceived and
behaves. As Holligan [2] notes the research student once seen as “disciple with duties and obligations”
becomes a “consumer with rights” [3]. Any shortfall in meeting the demand of a ‘consumer right’ can be
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measured and monitored, in the language of ‘performativity’, manifesting itself in terms of measurable skills
audits, training, statistics and performance criteria.
On the other hand, it may not be impossible to say that some academics may construe this trend as the
expression of increasing ‘professionalisation’ of the research degree process quite in tune with the prevailing
economic considerations (perhaps analogous to Stalin’s five year plans) seemingly a ‘good thing’, at least in the
utilitarian instrumentalist sense. Although even J S Mill would argue that the higher form of happiness
afforded by high art, intellectual and moral pleasure is to be preferred to contentment and mere physical
pleasures.
It has become a deeply held institutional belief, expressed as common ‘good practice’, internalising the
discourse of the market, that ‘performance’ [4] can be monitored, audited and measured against targets and
other apparently objective criteria, but quite possibly set by the mythical ‘market’ or some other convenient
ideology. Measuring and assessing performance, ‘performativity’, located in the audit culture is justified on the
grounds of openness, transparency, accountability and even objectivity [5].
However, the alleged essential objectivity of the idea of measurement (which gives it the force) is I believe
rather troublesome. Its etymology in the Latin word mēnsūra, suggests concepts of ‘limit’, ‘capacity’, ‘power’
and ‘extent’, themselves immeasurable notions suggesting that the notion of measurement is itself
indeterminate and far from being objective but is in fact contingent on what is being measured. Or, in other
words, the thing that is subject of measurement determines, or at least influences its apparently objective
measure and the mode of its measurement.
It may be illuminating (in his words) to remind ourselves of the words of John Henry Newman writing in 1858
on the Idea of a University [6] . He draws a clear distinction between ‘instruction’ and ‘knowledge’, a
distinction I am afraid we can easily overlook.
Newman writes that: [Liberal] “...knowledge is not a mere extrinsic or accidental advantage, which is
ours today and another’s tomorrow, which may be got up from a book, and easily forgotten again,
which we can command or communicate at our pleasure, which we can borrow for the occasion, carry
about in our hand, and take into the market; it is an acquired illumination, it is a habit, a personal
possession, and an inward endowment.”
“We are instructed, for instance, in manual exercises, in the fine and useful arts, in trades, and in ways of
business; for these are methods, which have little or no effect upon the mind itself, are contained in rules
committed to memory, to tradition, or to use, and bear upon an end external to themselves. But
education is a higher word; it implies an action upon our mental nature, and the formation of a
character; it is something individual and permanent…”
Perhaps we should ask how it is possible to perceive knowledge as anything but in terms of a ‘personal
possession’, an ‘acquired illumination’ ‘a habit’ and an ‘inward endowment’. However, it may rather hard to
locate ‘knowledge’, in Newman’s sense, in the prevailing discourse of performativity, commercialisation, the
rhetoric of ‘transferable skills’ seen in largely economic form, skills that “we can borrow, carry about and take
to the market” the audit culture, targets and the unflinching violence of the market; in short ‘things’ that can
easily be forgotten.
So how does the internalised market discourse effect the generation of knowledge through research. For
instance, Holligan notes that “the quantitative discourse of centralised success criteria” may pose ethical
dilemmas on supervisors, “some of whom may feel compelled to over-direct” [7]. The ‘over-directed’ response is
explained by Holligan as a response to the “consumerist-orientated ideology” generating the ‘engineering
model’ [8] of research and higher degree supervision. It results, he claims, in an academic environment where
students “expect ‘quick-fix’ solutions to their academic difficulties”, whilst their supervisors will remain loyal
to ‘old’ discourses and “respond with antipathy to insidious, commercialised discourse of performativity” [9].
It is possible that misunderstanding could arise from the dissonance of the competing expectations and the
discourses of commercialisation transforming the academic milieu.
Unfortunately such misunderstandings are often not mediated amicably, and manifest themselves in terms of
the “discourse of derision” – that is critical statements in the press and from funding bodies as to the alleged
shortcomings of supervisors [10].
On the other hand Murphy at al express no surprise at “problems with supervision” [11] and report that the
research into issues such as alleged supervision problems have looked at ‘policy and administration’,
supervision practice, and at largely administrative attempts to “define and encourage good practice” but to no
avail. Further, many attempts to ‘engineer out’ the alleged ‘problems’ have not been successful. This suggests
that the discourse is of the market is inadequate as a mechanism for adding to the body of human knowledge.
Briefly, ‘engineering out’ involves the production of ‘learning plans’ intended to identify “the knowledge and
skills gaps” [12] and how those gaps were to be bridged by attendance at compulsory courses. We can
recognise in this approach a blurring of Newman’s ‘training’-‘knowledge’ distinction; the boundary between
something illuminating and inherent, and an instrumental skill that can be taken to the market and then
forgotten. Moreover, the subsumption of knowledge into a memorised and learned skill raises questions about
intellectual originality and creativity of the piece of research, apparently located in the personalised consumer
rights culture of audit and accountability.
Sathye [13] describes well the various techniques and processes of the ‘engineering ‘model. He sets out how
learning plans, characterised in mechanistic terms as an ‘inventory of knowledge and skill level of the student’
are developed by a central committee established with the aim of determining “what set of skills and
knowledge are expected of research students” in order to secure instrumental outcomes of ‘timely’ completions
designed to mitigate centrally imposed financial penalties and to achieve measurable targets as to numbers of
completions and student satisfaction. Mechanisms which are not necessarily conducive to increasing abstract
understanding and knowledge.
Such an approach begs the question, which is not a politically neutral question, of who actually determines and
the sets the intellectual level and values of skills and knowledge expected of research students thus returning us
to the critical idea of the politics of supervision. We need to ask whether the level is to be set in order to secure
completions avoiding financial penalties and the corresponding metrics, or whether to bear the risk of
compromising originality (the consumer-orientated discourse of individual rights), or set to respect the
apprenticeship discourse of duties and obligations to the academy and one’s own ‘inward endowment’.
Although of course it is accepted that all students will need to have developed a range of skills (including
reading, writing, analytical, and critical frame of mind) before embarking on higher degree research, the
connection between mechanistically taught skills and the production of original knowledge expected at the
research level research is not always clear.
Rather, the ‘engineering/engineered model’ of supervision necessarily predicated on tight controlling
supervisory practice supported by formulaic skills training focused on manufacture of completions, which, as
in a factory, can be audited and measured. As we know the etymology of word ‘audit’ comes from Latin and
means the public ‘hearing’ or ‘examination’ of official accounts, a process we may not consider as appropriate
when we seek to ‘measure’ knowledge in accountancy terms.
We could wonder whether we would have ever heard of the general theory of relativity had Einstein had to
produce a ‘learning plan’, for instance. Undoubtedly Einstein was an intellectual giant and contributed hugely
to the body of human knowledge for the common good. However, any brief consideration of his self-confessed
lack of life skills [14] suggests that he would have quite likely have failed any research skills audit expected at a
modern university and may never been awarded his doctorate!
Murphy et al [15] describe the tension between the market driven discourse of accountability, student
satisfaction and completion rates, policed by the “controlling and task-focused” supervisor and the discourse
informed by Newmanian ideals manifest as the “guiding and person-focussed” supervisor. However, unlike
Holligan [16] who portrays the tension as arising from consequences of external politics and centralised
regulation coupled with consumer-orientated ideology, Murphy et al [17] adopt an apparently neutral process
of ‘social science’ methodology and look to the inner belief systems of the supervisor.
Thus we may conclude that generation of knowledge and the process of research student supervision cannot be
simply left to the whims of the violence market forces, student satisfaction surveys and metrics of completion
rates. Rather, it is argued, that it involves a critical engagement in a political moment of recurring internal
and external self-examination generating a critique of supervision as an original contribution to the body of
human knowledge.
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